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drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
ofonomic and commercial relations between the European Community and 
Iran 




By letter of 11 February 1975 the Committee on External Economic 
Relations requested authorization to draw up a report on economic and 
commercial relations between the European Community and Iran. 
By letter of 10 March 1975 the President of the European Parliament 
authorized the committee to report on this question. 
On 18 March 1975 the committee appointed Mr Klepsch rapporteur. 
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 
20 April and 18 May 1976 and unanimously adopted the motion for a resolution 
and explanatory statement at the latter meeting. 
Present: Mr Kaspereit, chairman, Mr Schmidt, vice-chairman, Mr Klepsch, 
rapporteur, Mr Baas, Mr Bayerl, Lord Castle, Mr Dykes, Mr Glinne 
(deputizing for Mr Corterier), Mr E. Muller, Mr Nyborg, Mr Radoux, 
Mr Spicer and Mr Thornley. 
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A 
The Cornrnittee on External Economic Relations hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on economic and cornrnercial relations between the European Cornrnunity and Iran 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the report of the Cornrnittee on External Economic 
Relations, (Doc. 119/76), 
1. Is astonished to find that since 30 November 1973 - the date on which the 
non-preferential agreement concluded between the two parties in 1963 
definitively expired - no trade agreement has linked the European 
Cornrnunity and the Empire of Iran; 
2. Considers that this situation is contrary to the interests of both 
parties who, following the considerable increase in Iran's revenues, 
are continually strengthening their ties in the economic and financial 
sectors; 
3. Emphasizes that the considerable development of these ties is evidence 
of the growing complementarity and interdependence of their economies; 
4. Invites, therefore, the Cornrnunity to open shortly, on the basis of the 
proposals contained in the Cornrnunication from the Commission to the 
Council on relations with Iran, negotiations with the Iranian authorities, 
with the aim of defining the framework and the content of the cooperation 
agreement to be entered into by the two parties; 
5. Considers that an agreement of this kind should enable the problems 
which exist between Iran and the Cornrnunity in the economic and commercial 
sectors to be resolved; 
6. Urges the Cornrnunity Member States to consult with each other and keep 
each other informed when negotiating and concluding bilateral cooperation 
agreements with Iran in the context of, and _in acc,ordance with, ~h.e· 
Council Decision of 22 July 1974; 
7. Requests the Council and the Commission to keep it regularly informed of 
the progress of negotiations between the Community and Iran; 
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of its 
committee to the Council and Cornrnission of the European Communities. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. Since 30 November 1973 the European Community has no longer been linked 
by any commercial agreement with the Empire of Iran. 
It was on that date that the non-preferential agreement signed in 
Drussels on 14 Octobor 1<)63 between the two parties - and subsequently renewed 
several times - finally terminated, the Iranian delegation having indicated 
that it did not wish it to be further renewed. 
2. At the same time, economic and commercial relations between the Member 
States and Iran were developing apace along with the large-scale industrial 
conversion and infrastructure effort undertaken by Iran following on the 
quadrupling of hydrocarbon prices since Autumn 1973, which should soon turn 
Iran into a major industrial power. 
3. In these circumstances, the anachronism of the 1963 agreement was 
recognized by all parties. It consisted merely in the granting of certain 
tariff facilities by the Community for Iranian exports of woollen carpets, 
raisins, dried apricots and sturgeon roes. 
4. It therefore only affected products which in 1974 made up a very small 
part of Iranian exports, whereas oil, which at the end of the Iranian IVth 
Plan in 1972-1973 accounted for 19.5% of the gross national product of the 
country, will probably represent, at the end of the Vth Plan in 1976, 48.7% 
of the resources of the country and provide at that date nearly half the 
income of the state, compared with less than one-fifth in 1972-73. 
5. In parallel with this considerable growth in its income from hydro-
carbons, which still constitute the priority item in the Vth Plan (oil 
processing, petrochemical industry) Iran undertook considerable efforts to 
develop its basic industry and make up the considerable leeway which existed 
in its infrastructures. It was able to do so thanks to the oil revenue 
surpluses, estimated for 1974-75 initially at 18-20 thousand million dollars 
and subse~uently at over 20,000 million. 
These figures had, however, to be revised downwards owing to the 
fall in oil sales and the two price-cuts for crude decided on by the 
Imperial Government in February. 
At the end of the VIth Plan (1982-83), according to the forecasts of 
the Teheran authorities, the country should be producing 15 million tons 
of steel, whereas its present capacity is scarcely more than 1 million tons, 
coming mainly from the Ispahan steelworks which was commissioned in 1972. 
Iran estimates that in 15 years extensive inroads will have been made into 
its oil resources and that it will therefore have to find other long-term 
resources. 
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6. Considerable efforts have been made since the 1960's to modernize the 
infrastructures, which are, in many cases, inadequate: airports and principal 
ports are congested (ships often wait several weeks to discharge their cargos 
at the ports of Bandar Shahpur and Bandar Bushire on the Persian Gulf: an 
ultra-modern port is to be built at Bandar-Abbas); the road network is 
unsuitable to traffic needs, the distribution sector is badly organized etc. 
7. However, the oil revenue has not all been injected into the Iranian 
economy: this would have had the effect, having regard to the structural 
underdevelopment, of driving the country into a hyper-inflationary process, 
multiplying the bottlenecks and increasing the already considerable social 
and regional disparities. 
8. In addition, the I.mperial government decided to use a substantial part 
of these resources to contribute to the aid fund intended for the poorest 
countries affected by the rise in price of oil products, to help - on a 
bilateral basis - a number of Middle East States (Jordan, Syria, Egypt) and 
Africa (Zaire, Sudan, Senegal, Tunisia, Morocco) and particularly those 
bordering on the Indian Ocean (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India) as 
also nearby Afghanistan, and to furnish loans to the World Bank and the I.MF. 
9. The governments and public opinion of the Community countries have 
become increasingly aware of Iranian acquisitions of industrial holdings in 
the Western market, bearing witness to the desire of the Teheran authorities 
either to secure for themselves privileged access to advanced technology, 
or to establish a portfolio of shares that would safeguard the country 
against the risks of monetary erosion. For example, there are the holdings 
taken in the capital of Krupp HUttenwerke, Bayer, the 10% holding in the 
capital of the Eurodif Company, which is building at Tricastin (France) a 
uranium enrichment plant based on the gaseous diffusion process. The 
Imperial government has also concluded loan agreements with certain countries 
of the Conununity: Great Britain for 1,200 million dollars, France (1,000 
million dollars lent to the Conunissariat a l'Energie Atomique), Italy, etc. 
10. The year 1975, however, saw a sharp decline in Iran's balance-of-payments 
surplus (from 10,700 million dollars in 1974 to 2,700 million in 1975). 
According to the Iranian authorities this was due to a fall in sales of crude 
to industrialized countries (a reduction of 21.2% between December 1974 and 
December 1975, entailing a revenue decrease of some 4,000 million dollars), 
while the price of capital goods ordered by Iran rose considerably. 
Consequently, the new budget for the Persian year 1355 (March 1976 -
March 1977), totalling some 40,000 million dollars, provides for a deficit 
of 2,400 million dollars. 
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The diificulties which have arisen have prompted the Iranian Government 
to introduce a number of modifications and savings in its expenditure pro-
gramme, without, however, jeopardizing the main targets of the development 
plan or projected investments in major Western undertakings. 
11. The above developments are obviously far removed fmm the dried apricots 
and raisins mentioned in the 1963 agreement. 
In fact, the Iran of 1976 no longer has anything in common with the in-
dustrially backward country of 1963 (the growth rate was 42% in 1974 and 17% 
in 1975). The European Conununity has played an increasing part in the rapidly 
developing trade of this country. It is now the leading supplier (44% of 
Iranian imports come from the Community) and its leading customer (23% of the 
oil exports and 33% of the non-oil exports of Iran go to the Community). 
12. All the parties concerned readily agreed to the termination of the 1963 
agreement and on the need to replace it by one more in line with the new 
situation, and, one might say, the shift in economic power in the world since 
1973. 
13. Exploratory talks between the Community authorities and an Iranian 
delegation began in January 1974. At that time, the members of the Iranian 
delegation expressed Iran's desire for the Nine to open their markets to some 
degree to Iranian exports of industrial products, in particular to those 
manufactured as a result of economic cooperation between undertakings in Iran 
and in the Conununity Member States. In general, they expressed Iran's interest 
in holding negotiations with the Community on commercial problems for which 
the Member States are no longer competent. 
14. The Commission delegation emphasized from the beginning that it was 
politically and legally impossible for the Conununity to expand the sphere 
of preferential agreements beyond the Mediterranean and ACP countries. 
Following meetings between Sir Christopher Soames and Mr Ansari, the 
Minister for Economic Affairs of Iran, the exploratory talks were continued 
between the two parties in 1974. 
15. In March 1974, the commission informed the council of the progress made 
in the first exchange of views with the Iranian delegation. The objectives 
pursued by the latter were as follows: the removal of all discrimination 
against Iranian products as compared with the products of other third 
countries. 
In the opinion of Iran, one of the beneficiary countries, the Community's 
generalized preferences system, while allowing duty-free entry to its exports 
of industrial products, contained many serious gaps because of the ceilings 
and tariff quotas involved. 
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Iran therefore asked for free access for all products manufactured 
in that country within the framework of joint ventures between Iranian and 
Community undertakings. Further, Iran also wished to see tariff barriers 
removed for refined petroleum products. 
16. These first meetings took place at a time when the Member States, 
attracted by the considerable growth in Iran's oil income and having to 
contend with the heavy drain on foreign currency following the increase in 
price of petroleum products, were establishing bilateral contacts on economic 
and commercial problems with the Teheran authorities. 
17. It soon became necessary to have these negotiations placed in a 
Community context. In September 1974 the Danish delegation asked that the 
Community authorities should hold an exchange of views on relations between 
the EEC and Iran. Shortly afterwards, the Permanent Representatives committee 
tackled this subject. 
18.The council discusiedthe state of relations between the Community and Iran 
for the first time on 12 November 1974. It emphasized the political and 
economic importance to the Community of these relations and stated its willing-
ness to consider the type of agreement best suited to furthering commercial 
and economic relations on a new basis. 
19. The uncertainty about the nature of the agreement continued throughout 
1975, although the attitudes of the individual delegations changed as the 
meeting:;proceeded. However, whereas several delegations accepted the 
principle of a preferential offer for part of the agreement to be concluded, 
the Commission stated its opposition to the extension of preferences outside 
the zones already established. 
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20. Faced with these differences of opinion, the Council and the Commission 
agreed in February 1975 to undertake further exploratory meetings with the 
Iranian delegation to determine the most suitable form of agreement to be 
concluded. In order to establish the requisite formula, Sir Christopher 
Soames conferred with Iranian officials in Teheran in May 1975. It emerged 
from these meetings that Iran was seeking a preferential type of agreement, 
whereas the commission still favoured an overall cooperation agreement of 
a new type which would cover all economic sectors. 
21. The meetings which resumed in July between the Commission and an Iranian 
delegation revealed that the difference between the two parties still remained, 
with Iran continuing to insist on the preferential formula. Faced with this 
'doctrinar difference, the Commission adopted a more pragmatic approach and 
asked the Iranian negotiators to specify the sectors in which they wished to 
benefit from Community preferences, while Iran demonstrated its impatience 
at the length of these 'exploratory' talks with the Commission and stated its 
intention to address itself directly to the governments of the Member States. 
22. Following further meetings between the Commission and the Iranian Foreign 
Minister, Mr Abbasalli Khalatbari, in Brussels in October 1975, it was found 
that the differences still persisted even though the Commission was coming to 
accept the idea of 'special' links with Iran. It was agreed that the technical 
problems to be solved would be examined at 'exploratory talks' to be held in 
Teheran from 27 to 29 October so as to define the particular sectors where 
difficulties still existed and to consider pragmatic ways of solving them. 
23. In January 1976 Mr Gundelach met Mr Ansari, the Iranian Minister for 
Economic and Financial Affairs. 
On 10 March 1976 the Commission forwarded to the Council a Corrununication 
finally recommending the opening of negotiations with Iran for the conclusion 
of an overall commercial and economic cooperation agreement. 
The aim of the agreement would be to establish active and extensive 
cooperation between Iran and the Corrununity, reflecting the close historical 
and economic ties between the two parties, the complementary and inter-
dependent nature of their economies, an:1 their resolve to develop mutual 
trade. 
As regards trade cooperation, each side would grant the other the status 
of most-favoured nation. Solutions to the tariff problems would be sought 
using trade policy measures appropriate to the spirit of the new relationship 
between Iran and the Community. 
Economic cooperation would favour balanced industrial development, joint 
ventures, investment, technical cooperation and technology. All available 
means would be used to ensure the free exchange of the fruits of this co-
operation between the two parties. Cooperation should centre on sectors 
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where the two economics complement each other, and the priority aim of the 
agreement would be to identify sectors where cooperation would be profitable, 
the cooperation itself evolving and expanding as relations between the EEC 
and Iran developed. 
The Conunission's reconunendations must now be examined by the Council. 
Official negotiations could begin as soon as it has taken a decision. 
24. What type of agreement should be chosen? 
In the opinion of your rapporteur, the approach proposed by the 
Commission largely meets the requirements of Iran and of the Community. 
Iran's economic and political importance, already mentioned in this 
report, makes her an essential partner for the Conununity, though she has 
certain problems not shared with other countries in the region. 
In view of this, we feel that relations between the Community and 
Iran should be considered on the basis of a fresh, individual approach, 
which must of course be compatible with the Community's international 
conunitments. 
25. In principle, Iran would like the Community to grant preferential 
treatment to its export products. 
This has already been granted, to a large extent, by means of generalized 
preferences. However, due to the autonomous nature of Community preferences 
and for various technical and political reasons, the Iranian authorities are 
not satisfied with this solution. They would prefer relations with the 
Community to be of a conventional nature, with preferential concessions, 
either as part of a preferential agreement like the JMediterranean agree-
ments. ' 
For political and legal reasons this does not at present seem· 
admissible. 
Facc,1 with these contradictions, it is therefore difficult to find a 
suitable c'.')lution to the problem of relations with Iran. 
26. In these circumstances it is to be hoped that the solution proposed by 
the Conunission of the European Conununities, which attempts to formulate a 
practical approach to the problems, may eventually satisfy both parties. 
This solution combines 'commercial cooperation', based on cooperation 
agreements such as that between the Community and India, and 'economic 
cooperation', based on the agreement which the Community is soon to conclude 
with Canada. 
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This would take account of possible future developments in Iranian 
exports, and of the likely increase in economic cooperation between the two 
parties, having particular regard to Iran's potential in the energy and raw 
material sectors, which are of great importance to the Community. 
27. We therefore feel that an economic and trade cooperation agreement would 
be the most satisfactory solution for both parties, given that economic 
cooperation at Community level would complement bilateral cooperation between 
Iran and Member States in individual sectors. However, to give this bilateral 
cooperation at least a minimum of coherence, the Member States should consult 
each other and keep each other informed of the contents of their agreements, 
using the 'consultation procedure for cooperation agreements between Member 
States and third countries', established by the Council Decision of 22 July 
1974. 
28. The main purpose of the Community-Iran agreement should be to establish 
the greatest possible degree of cooperation between companies in the Community 
and Iran in the exploitation of Iran's natural resources and the marketing of 
the end product. Iran's shares in several large Community companies should 
facilitate this trend. 
29. Such cooperation should, in our opinion, extend not merely to the 
advanced technology industry, but also to the agricultural sector. Iran is a 
major importer of agricultural products (cereals, milk, sugar, meat) of 
which the Community has large surpluses. Why not suggest long-term supply 
contracts in this sector, with guaranteed prices? 
We feel that relations between the two parties could be greatly extended 
in this sector. This prospect should be welcomed by those countries and 
regions of the Community in which agriculture still plays a predominant role 
and which, rightly or wrongly, often feel that they suffer most as a result of 
agreements between the Community and third countries (Mediterranean and ACP 
countries). 
30. As regards the supply of hydrocarbons, Iran should undertake not to dis-
criminate against the Community nor to hinder the export of its hydrocarbons 
to the Nine. 
31. One difficulty is, however, caused by Iran's desire to obtain community 
outlets for its petroleum and petrochemical products, etc., this being a 
sector in which Community production is greater than the requirements of the 
Nine. 
It will be remembered that one Member State had proposed that Iranian petrole'l.lll 
products produced by joint ventures with Conununity undertakings should be duty-
free. This proposal met with various objections from other Community delegations. 
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The problem would be difficult to solve in view of the non-preferential 
nature of the agreement to be concluded. On the other hand, it is impossible 
to envisage any form of cooperation with Iran that does not provide outlets· 
for its petroleum products, which will represent a growing percentage of its 
exports in coming years. 
It therefore seems to us that, in this particular sector, and in the 
interests of both parties, an exception, limited as to the nature of the 
products and the size of the outlets, should be made as regards the non-
preferential nature of the agreement, despite the legal and political 
difficulties this will undoubtedly involve. 
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